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I. Introduction
Contestable market and Theory of Industry Structure by W. Baumol, J.
Panzer, R. Willig provids a new approach for the multiproduct cost struc-
ture, competition, and market performance. Their main aim is to offer a pro-
duct more directly useful to the policymaker than the more abstract
mathematical writings.
There are at least three basic ideas presented here. First the crucial
feature of a contestable market is its vulnerability to hit-and-run entry. Even
a very transient profit opportunity need not be neglected by a potential en-
trant. They exclude the whole sunk cost of fixed capital. This means that all
capital is salable or reusable, setting aside existence of its well-organized
secondhand market. If all capital is so without loss other than that correspon-
ding to normal user cost and depreciation, then any risk of entry is
eliminated. Thus, contestable market may share an attribute with perfect
competition.
Second, they introduce useful cost concepts for the multiproduct firm.
These include economies of scope, product-specific return to scale,
multiproduct scale economies, ray scale economies, and subadditive cost
functions.
Third, they consider not only the notion of natural monopoly in single
product case but also in multiproduct case, and then represent that
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multiproduct monopoly can be financially viable if its cost function satisfies 
certain conditions. Traditional theory tells us that monopoly may result 
because of (1) the control by single firm of essential input, (2) patents on 
trademark, or (3) the exclusive right to sell. Monopoly firm caused by these 
reasons will obtain profits more than normal rate of profit. But a contestable 
market never offers more than a normal rate of profit to monopoly firm. 
This enables monopoly firm to have welfare properties. 
The purpose of this paper is to review the theory of the contestable market 
and investigate strictly some important results provided by Boumol et al. . 
]I. Natural Monopoly 
We begin by analysing single product cost structure and then define 
natural monopoly. 
All firms have the same cost function, C (.) . Let yi be the output of firm 
i, and let m be the number of firms. Q (.) is industry demand function, and 
p is the price of good. 
DEFINITION 1 : Strict Subadditivity A cost function C (y) is strictly subad-
ditive at y if for any positive quantities of outputs y 1, .. " ym, y =1= y, j = 1 , 






C (y) < L C (j). 
j= 1 
PROPOSITION 1. Strict subadditivity implies increasing return to scale. 
PROOF. Let C be homogenuos function of degree k. Then C Oy) = J.kC (y) for 
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1) 
J>O. If average cost is decreasing withy, we have, using Euler's theorem, 
!i C (y) 
dy y 
yC' (y) - C (y) < 0 ¢:::=,> yC' (y) < C(y) ¢:::=,>k< I 
y2 
We can see that return to scale is increasing if and only if k < 1 . If for ,( > 1 
C CAy) <JC (y) , it is obvious that C (y) /J<C (y) /y for J> 1 . This means 
that average cost is increasing with y. Hence this completes the proof. 
Then we have the following. 
PROPOSITION 2. Let C be a function from [0, 00) to [ 0, 00). Then C is 
strictry subaddive if C is strictly concave 2) and C (0) = 0 . 
PROOF. Since C is strictry concave, for x= 0, any y E (0, 00) , ,( > 0 , 
fl> 0, J+fl= 1, 
C CAx+ flY) = C (flY) > fl C (y) 
Thus, foranyaE (0,1), anyyE (0,00), 
C (ay) >a C (y) . 
IfY=Yl +Y2, Yl =ay, Y2 = (1 -a) y, for aE (0, 1), then C(Y2) = C 
( ( 1 -a) y) > ( 1 -a) C (y). This implies that C (y) -C (Y2) <a C (y). 
Thus C (y) <C (Yl) +C (Y2) because C (Yl»C (ay) >C (y) -C (Y2)' 
This proves the strict subadditivity of C. I 
Subadditivity can then be taken as the obvious criterion of natural monopo-
ly. 'That is, 
DEFINITION 2 : Natural Monopoly An industry is said to be a natural 
monopoly if over the entire relevant range of outputs, the firms' cost func-
1 ) Let C be homogenuous function of degree k, then for y= (y 1. . ... Yn) 
n aC 
k C (y) = }; Yj-;-. 
j= 1 rJYj 
2) A concave function Con J?n is said to be strictly concave. if ).C (x) + I1C (y) <C Ux 
+l1y)forx.YER".x~y. ),>0. 11>0. ).+11=1. 
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tion is subadditive. 
Ill. Sustainable Industry Configuration 
Next, we investigate a notion of sustainable industry configuration propos-
ed by Boumol et al .. 
DEFINITION 3 : Feasible Industry Configuration A feasible industry con-
figuration is composed of m firms respectively producing the non-negative 
output quantities y 1, ... , ym for sale at a price p such that 
m 
E yi=Q (p) and pyi-C 0'i) ~ 0 for i= 1, ... , m. 
i= 1 
That is to say, a configuration is feasible if production is sufficient to meet 
demand and no firm losing money. 
DEFINITION 4 : Sustainable Industry Configuration (Sustainability) A feasible 
industry configuration with price p and output y 1, ... , ym is sustainable if pe 
ye;£C eye) for allpe;£p andye;£Q (pe), whereP denotes incumbent's price, pe 
denotes entrant's price. 
This means that no outside potential competitor can enter by cutting 
prices and make money supplying quantities that do not exceed total market 
demands. 
We can find a price satisfying sutainability under particular restrictions on 
cost function. For example, cost function is as follow. 
(0 ;£y< 2 ) 
C 0')= ( 2 ;£y< 3 ) 
( 3 ;£y) 
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C, R C=C(y)~ 
4 -----------------------------------------------
25 __________________________________ _ 
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If there are four firms, we have an only sustainable price, p= I . For output 
1 of each firm leads sustainable industry configuration (see Figur 1). 
Sustainability plays the crucial role in defining equilibrium in contestable 
markets. Notwithstanding this fact, it is noted that there are not necessarily 
industry sustainable configuration. We can illustrate this as follows. Let 
reverse demond function be p= - (1 fa) y+b where a and b both are 
positive and constant (p<b) , and let cost function be C (y) = ( 1 fa) y+c 
where c is non-negative and constant. Take a c> 0 satisfying pe = p - c > 0 . 
Then 
Thus 
ye= -ape+ab= -a (-p+c+b) > 0 
peye=a (P-c) (-p+c+b) 
C eye) = (-p+c+b). 
peye-C eye) = (-p+c+b){a (P-c) - I } 
If a is a large number such that a (P-c) - 1 ~ 0, thenpeye~C eye). Hence 
there never exist p satisfying sustinability. Therefore, in general, if the 
elasticity of reverse demand function is extremly large and cost function is 
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slightly increasing, definition 3 is no significant. 
PROPOSITION 3. Let demand function Q (p) and cost function C (y) be 
3 ) 
continuous. Then in a sustainable industry configuration involving two or 
more producing firms, all firms must produce output at whichpyi=C (yi) , 
i= I, "', m~ 2. 
PROOF. Let p be a sustainable price. If pyi> C (yi) for i e { I, "', m}, then· 
by feasibility py > C (y), namely PQ (p) - C (Q (p)) > 0 . Since Q and Care 
both continuous, F (p) = PQ (p) - C (Q (P)) is continuous. Hence for 
enough small £ > 0 , F (p - £) > 0 . This coutradicts sustainability. I 
N. Multiproduct Cost Structure 
In this section we introduce and discuss the cost concepts in the 
multiproduct case. 
DEFINITION 5 : Economy of Scope Let P= {T 1 , T k } denote a nontrivial 
partition of SeN. UjTj =S, Tjn 1j=<jJ for i-:rrj, Ti-:rr<jJ and k> I . There 
are economies of scope at Ys with respect to the partition P if 
k 
E C (YTj) > C (Ys), (1 ) 
i= 1 
where (yfj, "', YTj) is a n - vector for which 
. iy~j> 0 jeT; 
Yh= 
o jeS-T; 
The term on the left side of (1) is the total cost of producing the bundle of 
goods Ys in k distinct firms, while the term on the right is the cost of produc-
ing Ys with a single firm. By definition subadditivity implies economies of 
3) Baumol. et al. 's proposition has not this restriction. They give a descriptive proof to it 
but not mathematical proof. It is obvious that their proposition do not necessarily hold 
without conditions on cost function. 
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scope, so that formally economies of scope can be interpreted as a restricted 
form of sUbadditivity. 
DEFINITION 6 : Ray Average Cost Let yO = (y~, yg) be the unit bundle 
for a particular mixture of output and let t be the number of unit in the bun-
n 
dIe Y = ty 0, such that }; Yio = 1 . Then the ray average cost (RA C) is defined 
j= 1 
as 
RAC (y) = C (ty O)/ t. 
One can regard RAe as the average of the composite good and measure the 
its absolute quantify. Figur 2 describes RAC. 
DEFINITION 7 : Degree of Scale Economi'es. The degree of scale economies 
defined over the entire product set N = { I, "', n}, at y = (y 1, "', Yn), is 
given by 
n 
SN (y) =C (Y)/y • vC (y) =C(y)/ };YiCi (y) 
j= 1 
where vC (y) = (aC/aYl' "', ac/aYn) , Ci (y) =aC (y)/aYi. 
PROPOSITION 4. Returns to scale at the output point yare increasing, 





This is a general version of proposition 1 . We can easily prove this proposi-
tion by using Euler's Theorem. 
·PROOF. If C is a homogeneous function of degree k, then C (ty) =fkC (y) 
n 
where t is positive and constant. This yields L Yj (ac/aYj) = kC(y). Thus, 
, j= 1 
since ac/aYj> ° for j= I, ... , n, we have 
n n 
SN= 1 ~ C (Y)/ LYj (ac/aYj) = 1 ~C (y) = LYj (ac/aYj)¢=:=> k= I' 
j= I j= I 
n n 
SN> 1 ~ c (Y)/ LYj (ac/aYj) > 1 ¢::::> c (y) > LYj (ac/aYj) ¢=) k<l 
j= 1 j= 1 
n n 
SN< 1 ¢::::> C (Y)/ LYj (ac/aYj) < 1 ¢=:=> C (y) < EYj (ac/aYj) ~ k> 11 
j= 1 j= 1 
DEFINITION 9 : The degree of scale economies specific to the product set 
TeN at Y is given by Sr (y) = I Cr (Y)/ L yjCj (y), where ICr(Y) =C(Y) 
j= 1 
-C(YN-r). 
PROPOSITION 5. C is increasing return to scale with respect to Tat Y if and 
only if Sr> 1 , decreasing if and only if ST< 1 , and constant if and only 
if ST= 1 . 
PROOF. Since C is a homogeneous function of degree k, for YT= (y 1 , Yt, 
0, ... , 0) 
C (t YT) =fkC (YT). 
We have, by Euler's theorem, 
n aC t aC 
.E YJa\1.=.L Y}a 11 .=kC (YT), 
}'= I JJ J= I J} 
If Sr (y) > 1 , then 
t aC 
C(y) -C(YN-T) > LYra .. 
j=l Y, 
Thus we have, by(2) 
(2) 
C(y) -C(YN-T) = C( (y 1, "',Yt,Yt+ 1 , "',Yn) ) -C( (0, ... , O,Yt+ 1 , .. , ,Yn)) 
t ae 
> LYJ(j\1.=kC (YT)=kC (Yl,"·,Yt,O,···,O)). 
j= I JJ 
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Hence 




It is necessary for (4) that k< 1 , so that C is increasing return to scale by (2). 
The proof of cases where S< 1 and S= 1 are perfectly analogous. I 
DEFINITION 10 : Trans-Ray Convexity A cost function C (y) is trans-ray con-
vex through some point y* = (yt, ... , Y#') if there exists any vector of 
positive constraint WI, ... , Wn such that for every two output vectors ya = 
n 
CY1, ... , JPn) and yb = (yb1, ... , y~) that lie on the hyperplane E W 1 Y 1 = W 0 
n n n j= 1 
through pointy* 4) (so that they safisfy E wV"/= E w,y~= E w,yt'-) for a such 
j= 1 j= 1 j= 1 
that 0 <a< 1 we have 





4 ) Let P be hyperplane passing through y* vertical to w, then 
P={X I (X-y*) W= O} 
Moreover if P' is hyperplane passing through ya, we have 
P'={X I (X-ya) w= O} 
Thus Xw=yaw= 1: y,D Wj. Hence P=P' because ya passes through P'. 
;= 1 
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Trans-ray convexity requires that the production cost of a weighted 
average of a pair of output bundles, yo and yb, is not greater than the 
weighted average of the cost of producing each of them in isolation. A graph 
of this concept can be drawn as Figur 3 . 
Baumol et al. suggest that trans-ray convexity and economies of scale at 
every point implies that there will be a monopoly. To provid an intuitive ex-
planation, assume that the cost function has the property ray economies of 
scale at every point in conjunction with transray convexity. In Figur 4 , 
curve OBy charactrizes the ray economies of scale and curve ABC represen-
ting trans-ray convexity has an only bottom point B. In this case there is a 
strong possibility of existence of monopolist. Let p = (p 1, P 2) be fixed 
prices, and let R be total revenue, then R (y) = PlY 1 + P 2Y 2. If there exists 
a monopolist, he can exclude entrant by setting prices to P such that revenue 
hyperplane passes through 0 and is tangent to curve ABC at B in Figur 4 . 










c3 -~ Y2 (Qy) 
~ 
0 
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V. Economic Implications 
We have described the essentials of the theory of the perfect contestable 
market and given some propositions with refereuce it. In this section, we ex-
amine economic implications of the theory. 
First, we can use a new analytic methods of the theory as a standard 
public policy. There are various artificial barriers to entry, for instance, 
cartel formation, legal institution, or government intervention, in today's 
market. Almost all of companies defended by those barriers may obtain pro-
fits more than normal profits. They may charge high prices so much to con-
sumers. The theory shows that if those barriers is removed, then prices fall 
and their excessive profits come to equal to normal profits when fixed capital . 
is not sunk. This means that all consumers may get a benifit by competition. 
Second, the analytic methods of the theory is usefull for understanding of 
the meaning of local production, or decentralization of industries into the 
consuming place. Recently in our country, National Railway, the telecom-
munication company have divided and privatized, It seems that the divisions 
of those big enterprize is a result reverse to what the theory intends. But we 
can construe the implication of division of company with the theory. We 
show this by Figur 4. Suppose that firm A produces commodity Q in place 
X, and that its cost curve is presented by AyaO in Figur 4. Then assume 
that its cost curve of commodity Q in place Y is given by CybO in Figur 4 . 
We replace Q in place X with Qx and Q in place Y with Qy, interpreting that 
commodity Qx is different from commodity Qy. Here we investigate what set 
ofXAandXBaremosteconomica1. Ify} =yL forya= (y}, 0), yb= (0, y~), 
we see thaty= c.y}, y~) is a set of XA and XB that may the make production 
cost of quantify Yl smallest. Thus it is most costless for firm A to producey} 
in place X and y ~ in place Y. This may yield a benifit of division for firm A. 
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